then takes. She thereby exhibits a form of autonomy and her life a form of 'ownedness', as Heidegger's 'Eigentlichkeit' might be more literally translated.
Iain Thomson offers a recent example of such a view. He identifies Heidegger's 'anxiety' and 'death' with 'an anguished experience of the utter desolation of the self ' (2013: 262) , in which 'all of our projects … break down simultaneously ' (p. 270) . This is a condition out of which we can emerge, however: we can perform a 'passage through death' in the form of a 'reflexive reconnection to the world of projects lost in death ' (2013: 272-73 and 2004: 453) . Indeed our experience of anxiety/death makes this reconnection one in which we have 'the freedom to choose' which projects to reconnect to. This experience 'break[s] the previously unnoticed grip arbitrarily exerted upon us by das Man's ubiquitous norms of social propriety, its pre-and proscriptions on what one does ' (2013: 273, 274 and 2004: 455) ; instead we now 'become capable of "choosing to choose"', and-having made such a choice-acquire 'the subsequent responsibility for having so chosen ' (2013: 273) .
Despite the popularity of this kind of reading, the view it ascribes to Heidegger has also long been thought to be deeply problematic. The principal objection is that-as if 'nothing matters', 'Dasein is paralyzed ' (2005: xx) . To see how, let us consider, for example, our 'reconnecting' choices. If we take these to rest upon considerations that favour particular projects over others, then we would not seem to have made 'a decision that goes all the way down'; we are not-as the rhetoric goes-genuinely 'liberated' after all, in that the choice will be being made on the basis of a 'taken for granted background framework', one which declares certain projects praiseworthy and others not. So if we imagine making such a choice in the face of anxiety, it cannot be the case that it is 'universal meaninglessness we experience in Angst' (Philipse 1998: 395) . But if such choices are not made on the basis of any such considerations, they would instead seem arbitrary, little better than the tossing of a coin. It is hard to see the making of such a 'choice' as constituting our taking responsibility for our lives; rather it would seem to be a perfect example of not doing so. As Tugendhat puts it ! 4 A choice … that is not made in the light of reasons … is a choice in which I leave how I choose to accident; and in this respect we have to say that it was not I who chose. (Tugendhat 1986: 216) I will refer to this problem as 'the Motivation Problem' (MP). In a sense, it reaffirms a worry that Sec. 1 raised-that Dasein's existence, as a performer of meaningful actions, is incompatible with 'the meaninglessness of existence' (Dahlstrom 2013 : 15)-and we can see MP at work in Thomson's discussion. He talks of our being 'stranded (as it were)' in 'th [e] paralysis of our projects experienced in death ' (2013: 271, 273 and 2004: 453, 454) . But a solution to MP is implied in remarks Thomson makes when insisting that the freedom that anxiety/death reveals to us 'is always constrained ' (2013: 273 and 2004: 454) : the constraints include Dasein's 'ontic talents, cares, and predispositions' and 'the pre-existing concerns of our time and "generation" ' (2013: 273) . The 'solution' to MP emerges as Thomson slides away from treating these constraints as mere constraints. He tells us that, against the background they provide, 'it … matters that this particular role has been chosen by this particular Dasein', because some choices will 'develop its particular ontic and factical aptitudes as these intersect with the pressing needs of its time and generation ' (2013: 274, italics added) . So the choices we make in reconnecting to the world are motivated by, or 8 grounded in, our 'ontic cares' and the 'pressing needs' and 'concerns' of our 'time and generation'. But this will not do. Assuming that we want to avoid MP, something must indeed move us if we are to 'pass through' anxiety/death; and perhaps this something includes 'ontic cares' and the needs of our time and generation. But if we have these cares and find these needs pressing in anxiety/death, then the latter cannot be the 'catastrophic collapse' Thomson describes it as being. Being moved by such cares and needs, our choices made in the face of anxiety may not be arbitrary. But if we are so moved, this undermines the vision of liberation through anxiety/ death that views of this sort espouse and the accounts of 'choosing choice', taking responsibility, etc. that this vision underpins.
! 5
3.

Questioning the Meaninglessness Assumption -I
One way to respond to these difficulties is to question whether anxiety really does reveal that 'nothing matters'. This section and the following consider two ways of doing that.
One is to claim that, though there are genuine sources of motivation, anxiety/death blinds us to them: it is, in some sense, a deceptive or delusional state. One of the first advocates of a 'world collapse' reading, Bill Blattner, has offered a not-dissimilar view in his recent work.
Blattner depicts anxiety as 'a complete collapse of the structure of meaning in which one lives ' (2006: 139-40) but also insists that Heidegger is not claiming that in anxiety we realize the 'deep truth' about our lives, that everything is worthless or meaningless. … Anxiety is a kind of breakdown experience, breakdown in the living of a human life, rather than a window onto the truth. (2006: 142, 144 ).
But such a view will not solve the difficulty set out at the end of the previous section, because motivation to which we are blind cannot motivate 'passage through' anxiety/death. I do not wish to imply that Blattner assumes his view does solve that kind of difficulty; but we do pass close by here a criticism that Dreyfus has made of his account, namely, that it is not clear on Blattner's view 'what a life of readiness for an anxiety attack would be like' (Dreyfus 2005: xx) . If such readiness is meant to help one deal (in some sense) with anxiety when it strikesto do something in the face of anxiety-then it is hard to see what that something might be when one faces (what one at least experiences as) a 'complete collapse of the structure of meaning in which one lives'. One could propose that anxiety/death simply passes, coming to an end all by itself, so to speak. But if so, it is unclear why the authentic would count as any more 'ready' for the experience in question than the inauthentic are.
Interestingly, there is, I think, a way of reconstructing Thomson's view such that it follows Blattner's in taking anxiety/death to be delusional but has the advantage over Blattner's of understanding that delusion as one for which one can be ready. Yet more interestingly, this ! 6 reconstruction would spare Thomson MP. But it comes at other-and, for Thomson, excessive -costs. To begin, let us consider what happens in anxiety/death as a result of which our 'life-projects' collapse. In it, Thomson tells us, our projects 'founder[] on the reef of their own contingency ' (2013: 271) . To believe that the contingency of projects renders them meaningless would seem to require that one operate with a rather particular standard of meaningfulness; and Thomson identifies one, the rejection of which he also declares to be 9 key to 'passage through death': we realise that 'there is ultimately nothing about the ontological structure of the self which could tell us what specifically we should do with our lives ' (p. 270) . If one's notion of a meaningful project is one dictated by 'the ontological 10 structure of the self', then our life-projects 'founder on the reef of their own contingency'.
Thomson tells us that our 'reconnection to the world' 'turns on our giving up the unreflexive, paralysing belief that there is a single correct choice to make ' (2013: 273 and 2004: 453, 454) . One way this 'giving up' could be key is that we would then see through a confused 11 denigration of our 'factical' sources of motivation: we could 'reconnect to' our 'ontic cares' and the 'concerns' of 'our age and generation' because we would no longer dismiss them on the grounds that they are not reflective of 'the ontological structure of the self'. This would also suggest an understanding of how one might be ready for anxiety. If one accepts the 'paralyzing belief's' distorted standard of meaningfulness, then recognition of the contingency of one's life projects will seem to entail their meaninglessness. But if one doesn't, it won't: one will be ready for anxiety in that one does not hold a belief-the 'paralysing belief'-that one must hold if the above recognition is to precipitate a 'global' and 'catastrophic collapse' of 'all of our life-projects' (Thomson 2013: 271, 269) .
But this reconstruction will not do either. For Thomson, giving up the 'paralysing belief' is key to our 'reconnection to the world' because 'recognizing that there is no such correct choice (because there is no substantive self to determine such a choice) is what gives us the freedom to choose ' (2013: 273 and 2004: 454) . But this would be a non sequitur on the above reconstruction. According to that reconstruction, 'giving up' the 'paralysing belief' removes a ! 7 slander that has been hanging over our existing, 'factical', contingent sources of motivation; but that gives us no reason to think that our choosing our forms of motivation makes sense.
One's being freed from a confusion that obscures real reasons one has for acting restores one, as it were, to one's real motivational world; it does not give one a (more or less) free hand to reshape it.
Blattner does not face this problem, because his picture of authenticity differs. When authentic, rather than being 'lost in the Anyone' (Blattner's preferred rendering of das Man), one responds to 'the demands of one's situation and one's disposition': 'to find oneself and win oneself is to see what is factically possible and important and to carry through with it ' (2006: 166) . To hold such a view-and this will be an important thought later-is to acknowledge what one might think of as the 'given'-'found' rather than 'chosen'-character of our motivation at its most fundamental level: '[t]o be Dasein, to be a person', Blattner proposes, 'is to find oneself differentially disposed towards the possibilities the world has to offer, differentially disposed by way of confronting those possibilities in terms of which they matter to one ' (p. 155) . What allows Blattner to adopt these views while seeing anxiety/death as an experience in which 'none of [Dasein's] possibilities matter to it differentially ' (1994: 67) is his denial that this experience is 'a window onto the truth'. But, as mentioned above, what remains unclear about his view is how the authentic person might be 'ready' for that experience.
4.
Questioning the Meaninglessness Assumption -II ' (2010: 223) . It is these 'traces'-these 'aspects of the self that remain intact in death'-that 'motivate Dasein's return to the world' (p. 221).
Burch identifies these 'traces' as 'the desire for hedonic repetition', 'a desire for an idiosyncratic repetition' (underpinned by 'an ever-ready constellation of dispositions and habits available for repeating a familiar self-world arrangement') and a 'desire to recover' 'eudaimonistic satisfaction' (pp. 222-23).
As he himself says, Burch's account 'goes beyond interpretation to construction ' (p. 233, cf. p. 227) and some of the constructive notions invoked strike me as rather unHeideggerian in spirit (the first and third form of 'trace', for example). But it also raises a version of the worry Burch's is a complex account and I cannot do it justice here. Instead in the remainder of this paper, I will offer an interpretation of my own of what anxiety involves, one which has some similarities to Blattner's more recent view and yet more to my reconstruction of Thomson's. But as a final prelude, let us remind ourselves of four requirements that have emerged in our ! 9 discussion so far and which-it seems-an account of anxiety should strive to meet. It needs to identify 1) an experience of the meaninglessness of things 2) which does not necessarily paralyse us (pace MP)
3) for which we can-in some sense-be ready, and 4) which can play a role in a story about choosing oneself, choosing choice, assuming responsibility, etc.
Burch's view seems to fail to meet requirement (1), Thomson's view (2), Blattner's recent view (3), and my reconstruction of Thomson's view (4) . My own interpretation, I will argue, meets all four.
Heidegger's Depiction of Inauthenticity I -Intimations of an Alternative Picture of Anxiety/Death
To begin, I want to draw attention to some interesting twists in the formulations using which Heidegger characterises anxiety, formulations which paint a very particular picture of the inauthentic.
In anxiety, the possibility of authenticity is revealed 'undisguised by entities within-the-world, to which, proximally and for the most part, Dasein clings' (SZ 191, quoted above). Now 'the "world" can offer nothing more': '[a]nxiety … takes away from Dasein the possibility of understanding itself, as it falls, in terms of the "world" and the way things have been publicly interpreted' (SZ 187). Similar notions can be found in remarks on death:
The possibility of death means that … at some time … the world will have nothing more to say to me, that everything to which I cling, with which I busy myself, and about which I am concerned will have no more to say to me and will no longer be of help to me. (WDR 168)
The person whom anxiety/death rocks back on her heels is then the person who 'clings' to entities; she wants to 'understand [her] self … in terms of the "world" and the way things have been publicly interpreted', and has turned to the world in search of 'something on the basis of which [she is] able to live' (WDR 168). But in anxiety/death, I see that this world 'to which I cling, [and] with which I busy myself', has 'no more to say to me' and is 'no longer … of help to me'.
But what kind of 'help' did I expect? What did I hope this 'world'-that to which I 'cling'-would 'say' to me? It would seem that I hoped it would (somehow) determine for me how to live. As the 1925-26 Logic lectures put it, '[i]n inauthentic concern', Dasein 'places itself into its concern about things in such a way that its conduct [Verhalten] is determined in terms of the object of that concern': 'the things with which I am involved ultimately determine me and my being' (L 193) . But in anxiety/death, we see that such things provide no such
Such passages present a picture of a craving for legitimation or justification being thwarted.
The following three sections will elucidate this picture by exploring some parallels with thoughts found in Wittgenstein's rule-following considerations. These parallels will help us see what this craving might be, how it might seem to be satisfied, why it must-in fact-be thwarted, and how that realisation might lead to the shocking conclusion that the world is meaningless-provoking both fears of paralysis and a vision of 'liberated' free choice. But these parallels also suggest, I will argue, a different way in which Heidegger might be read.
A Wittgensteinian Analogy
Central to Wittgenstein's discussion of rule-following is his well-known discussion of ostensive definition and its apparent limitations. I may point at a London bus and say 'That is what we mean by "red"'. But the notion that such an explanation serves to justify or ground that word being used in some particular way collapses once one recognizes that, though this
object is indeed red, it is also in England, heading to Kings Cross Station, at 30 mph, in the rain, on a Tuesday, etc. etc. The object is indeed a sample of something red; but it also instantiates these other (and indefinitely numerous) concepts. The bus's being red is a reason for describing it as red; but it is a reason to describe it as red rather than blue, and not a reason to describe it as red rather than in England, heading to Kings Cross Station, etc. etc.
The same difficulty will arise-I suggest-if I hope to read a 'basis on which I am able to live' off the objects with which I deal. Every object presents an indefinite number of differently meaningful faces to us, corresponding to an indefinite number of different ways in which we might deal with-live around-it. This is no challenge to the truth of the descriptions of the objects under which we see these objects when we deal with them in these ways. But it does draw our attention to the fact that I cannot expect those objects to-as it were-themselves dictate their meaning for me, the aspects of them that are worth my describing and which I ought to consider when I act: they cannot 'determine me and my
But who would ever think that they would or could? No one-wittingly. But the above
Wittgensteinian reflections show how naturally we fall into this kind of confusion. The confusion about the samples exposed above arises out of our taking the objects around us to be-so to speak-exclusively and inherently what they represent in the practices in which we merely happen to be engaged; we treat the bus's redness as something like its essential meaning, when, in fact, it is merely the particular aspect of it in which we happen to be taking an interest. (To adapt an expression of Wittgenstein's, '[w] e predicate of the thing what lies in the mode of representation' (Wittgenstein 1967: §104) .) But crucially, for many of us, our first encounter with Wittgenstein's reflections on ostensive definition is precisely an experience of surprise, in light of which indeed we look at our samples-to which we have previously turned without pause in explaining our words-as now somehow strangely dumb, exposed as unfit to convey the meaning we intend because-as we now recognize-they carry a babble of indefinitely many meanings. In our engaging with the entities in question in a way informed by our use of particular concepts, the entities present themselves to us-up until such moments of reflection-in those terms; and the surprise comes because we have-so to ! 12 speak-fallen into the habit of taking these entities to simply-essentially, exclusively-be what those terms present them as being. The fact that we are shocked reveals that we have 'fallen' in this way.
There is, one might suggest, an animistic quality to our confused ambition for our samples here: it is as if we expect an entity to determine which of the many concepts under which it falls we should use in thinking of it. That very multiplicity means no answer is there to be found and what we hear when we allow ourselves to think that one is is merely an echo of the concepts which we already happen to be applying to these entities. By forgetting, as it were, that we are already describing and living around these entities in these ways, and that we could-and perhaps at other times do-describe and live around them in other ways, we succumb to an illusion that the former ways are the right ways of describing and living around these entities. In this way, this animistic fantasy supports and is supported by a fantasy of a certain anonymity: I am an anonymous observer who simply deals with the world as the world itself dictates it should be dealt with, the legitimacy-indeed necessity-of the way I relate to the world seeming to follow from a simple description of what is there before my eyes.
Wittgenstein shows us how natural this confusion is. But more importantly given our present concerns, this is a confusion that tallies closely with the inauthentic person's experience of his world as Heidegger describes it.
7.
Heidegger's Depiction of Inauthenticity II -The Desire to be 'Lived' by the 'World'
That the way we deal with an entity-embodied in our understanding of its 'Being'-might be read off that entity is a confusion that Heidegger clearly identifies and links to inauthenticity. As he puts it, 'Being can never be explained by entities but is already that which is "transcendental" for every entity': 'entities can be experienced "factually" only when
Being is already understood ' (SZ 208, 315) . But 'common sense' 'fails to recognize' this; What I am experiencing-to adapt an expression from BPP 174-is actually no more than 'a mirroring back of the self from things' and, in anxiety, I see through this fantasy. I become aware that there are no 'meanings' to objects that are 'inherent' or 'essential' in this sense:
objects lack 'importance in themselves' (SZ 187). Instead I see that the meaning of the objects that I encounter is determined by the life I happen to be living, a responsibility that this fantasy-illicitly and confusedly-projects on to the objects themselves.
When one is in the grip of this fantasy, the realisation that entities have no such inherent or essential meaning will indeed come in the form of a kind of dizzying alienation, a certain a leeren Erbarmungslosigkeit-an 'empty mercilessness' or 'pitilessness' (SZ 343). We cannot be 'lived' by such entities, because they have no 'life' of their own; or, as one might instead put it, they have too many lives, and no particular interest in-or pity for-ours.
The Upshot of the Fantasy being Recognized
What then is the upshot of this? Does it follow that our lives are meaningless? Or that the way we live our lives in this world is a matter of a 'liberated' 'free choice' that 'goes all the way down'? There are indeed analogues of these thoughts in the rule-following literature. As mentioned, our samples can now seem dumb, and that can seem to show that 'meaning vanishes into thin air' (Kripke 1982: 22) ; or-to the realisation that ' [t] here is nothing … which forces [us] to apply a word in the way [we] do' (Glendinning 1998 : 102)-one might be tempted to add 'so it's up to us': it's a matter of convention. But such views-meaning scepticism and conventionalism-are both deeply problematic; and, significantly, there is 17 quite a broad consensus in that literature that they are not the morals to be drawn from the ! 15 rule-following considerations. I want to suggest that their analogues are not the morals to be drawn from Heidegger's discussion of anxiety either.
An alternative response to the rule-following considerations is often thought to lie in the fact that certain extrapolations of series of samples simply come naturally to us, 'there being no need for hesitant and questionable interpretation' (Sullivan 2011: 185) : while others strike us as artificial or odd, these extrapolations 'speak to us', one might say, just as-without need for justification or other persuasion-we naturally take arrows to point from tail to tip (Wittgenstein 1969: 141) .
There are a number of quite different ways in which one might develop these thoughts. Some philosophers see them as providing the basis for reductive, naturalistic accounts of meaning, according to which meaning is determined by, among other things, our shared dispositions to react to samples. But others see them as playing a role within an anti-reductionist strategy, according to which we should reject the need for the kind of underlying justification or determination of our ways of thinking and talking of which meaning scepticism and conventionalism feel the absence.
18
The latter approach derives sustenance from the fact that our grasping any explanation of how a word should be applied presupposes that we already see the world in the terms that that explanation itself uses. But this would seem to show that eventually-at the end of any such chain of justifications-I must simply find myself '[a]t home in the world', in a condition in which 'I can simply say what I see' (Sullivan 2011: 184) . Despite the fact that the entities I 19 encounter have an indefinite number of different things to 'say' to us in instantiating an indefinite number of different possibilities, it remains the case-to adapt Blattner's wordsthat I must 'find myself differentially disposed towards the possibilities the world'-these entities-'has to offer'. Among those possibilities must be ones that I have not been persuaded ought to be attended to or taken as salient, as mattering. Here, as Wittgenstein puts it, reasons 'come to an end' (Wittgenstein 1967: §1) .
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Whether either the naturalistic or the anti-reductionist understandings of these themes ultimately can be defended is the subject of much controversy in the rule-following literature; and I won't pursue those matters here. Instead I want to develop an analogue of 20 the anti-reductionist view in filling out my reading of Heidegger's discussion of anxiety. I will argue that the resultant reading has some independent philosophical plausibility, meets our interpretive requirements (1-4), and offers a viable alternative to the analogues of meaning scepticism and conventionalism that we have encountered in Sec. 2-4.
Projects that Speak to Us
Consider then the possibility that certain projects strike us as worthwhile in themselves, and
as not needing justification. Prime examples for many of us might be taking care of our loved ones and pursuing our vocations. I may see that there are many other, perhaps recognizably Characterising our relationship to such projects is difficult and we inevitably reach for metaphors. Such projects might be said to 'speak to me', though not in the sense of telling me what to do or ordering me to do such-and-such; I respond to them without any sense of needing to be compelled or persuaded to respond. To give a twist to a metaphor of Heidegger's which we have already seen Sullivan echo, we feel 'at home' in such activities, though not in the sense that I see them as somehow determined as the right ways to behave by the fabric of the world around me. Similarly, they strike me as 'natural', but-again-not in the sense that they conform to the 'inherent' meaning of the entities I encounter-or, for that ! 17 matter, to 'the ontological structure of the self'. Rather they strike me as natural in that I feel no need for a confirming conformity with any such validating standard. I may be ready with respect to being a good father; but am I ready full-stop? Many of the projects we undertake in life will not speak to us in this way-my standing in this queue, or filling in this form, or walking up this hill with these heavy bags. Some of these projects may be tied to particular offices I hold, roles I occupy, or norms current in my society. I may or may not find those offices, roles and norms themselves intrinsically meaningful and, if not, some may be tied to serving further projects which I do. The 'tranquilizing' fantasy that anxiety/death sweeps away is that the entities with which we deal somehow take care of these issues for us, and that sweeping away forces upon us once again the question of which of my activities fall within which of these categories. If one were to label those projects that speak to me 'my ownmost', those that here and now serve my 'ownmost' 'provisional', and those 
Our Requirements Revisited
Let us return now to requirements (1-4). Obviously enough, the above account solves MP (requirement (2) above); and it does so while preserving senses in which anxiety reveals that the world is meaningless (1), and its being an experience for which some of us-the authentic -are ready (3). It is also worth noting that it accommodates the thought that Dasein is a creature of a meaningful world, which-as Sec. 1 indicated-seems to be a consequence of other important themes in Heidegger's thought.
According to the above account, if one understands the world as the source of a particular kind of justificatory meaning, then anxiety reveals that the world is-in this sensemeaningless; in this way, anxiety embodies a 'window on the truth'. This realisation paralyzes some of us-the inauthentic-who have 'clung' to such justifications. But others amongst us do not need the 'pity' that that fantasy promises: the authentic are 'ready for anxiety' because they have tied their lives to projects that speak to them and for which they feel no need of such a justification: anxiety 'neither inhibits nor bewilders' them. There is then also a sense in which our anxious experience of the meaninglessness of things is deceptive: the meaning that we come to see things lack is essential only to a fantasy of what it takes for our lives to have meaning, and recognizing this fantasy for what it is is crucial to the real moral, so to speak, of anxiety.
Herein lies the similarity to my reconstruction of Thomson's view. Central is a conception to which some of us cling, because it serves-as SZ 190-91 quoted above puts it-to 'disguise' the real demands of a meaningfully lived life; and once that disguise is removed, a second-and genuine-revelation of meaninglessness becomes possible: I may now come to see that, as a matter of contingent fact, my life has been meaninglessgenuinely meaningless, one might say-in being devoted not to projects that I myself find intrinsically worthwhile, but to 'the endless multiplicity' of 'accidental' possibilities which merely 'offer themselves as closest to' me. The collapse of this delusion, like the collapse of
Thomson's 'paralyzing belief', restores us-as I put it earlier-to our real motivational world in that it reveals the real touchstones for meaning in our lives: the projects that strike us as intrinsically worthwhile but with which our lives, as a matter of fact, may fall out of alignment.
However, our earlier reconstruction of Thomson's view failed: the fact that the fantasy upon which it focused is a fantasy does not entail that one is free to choose one's life-projects (even if only constrainedly), as Thomson's view maintains. It is no consequence of my view either that we might choose which projects speak to us. But fortunately, my view points to a quite different understanding of the role that notions of responsibility, 'choosing to choose' and 'choosing oneself' play here (requirement (4)), as well as to a quite different understanding of the challenge that being authentic is.
Choice, Responsibility and Authenticity Revisited
The authentic person's acting on those possibilities that speak to her can, I suggest, be understood as her having 'chosen to choose'. Heidegger tells us that, '[w]ith Dasein's lostness in the "They"', 'Dasein makes no choices, [and] gets carried along by the nobody
[Niemand]' (SZ 268); deciding how one will live 'from one's own Self' (SZ 268), on the other hand, is choosing to let one's own fundamental projects-those that strike one as worthwhile in themselves-guide one's life. To act on one's own reasons-rather than those of others or the They-is to have chosen to choose oneself how to live, rather than letting others-and their reasons-decide for one. Similarly, when Heidegger talks of 'choosing one's self', the ! 20 'choosing' in question is not choosing one's self-as if one had freedom to select from a range a self and its view of what a worthwhile life is-but choosing oneself-choosing to be guided by one's own fundamental commitments rather than those of others. It is my choosing myself over 'the world' or 'the public', as Heidegger puts it-my choosing to act on reasons that speak to me, rather than those of the They.
I suggest we see such a choice described in the passage from WDR 168 from which I quoted earlier:
Dasein can comport itself in such a way that it chooses between itself and the world; it can make each decision on the basis of what it encounters in the world, or it can rely on itself. Dasein's possibility of choosing offers the possibility of fetching itself back from its having become lost in the world, that is, from its publicness. When Dasein has chosen itself, it has thereby chosen both itself and choice.
To echo the last sentence here, in making decisions on the basis of my own reasons, I am deciding both to decide and to be the one who decides. I am choosing myself as the one who will choose-rather than deferring the judgment in question to someone else-to 'the world' or the They-and their assessment of what matters. This is also recognizably something that could be called 'assuming responsibility for oneself and one's actions'. The above passage continues:
This choosing … is the choice of responsibility for itself that Dasein takes on and that consists in the fact that in each instance of my acting I make myself responsible through my action. The authentic 'own' their existence in that they take responsibility for their lives; they themselves take as much control as they can of the course their lives take, in endeavouring to shape their lives to their own sense of what matters: they attempt-as SZ 188 quoted above puts it-to 'take hold of' themselves. The inauthentic, on the other hand, renounce that task and thereby hand this responsibility on to the They by default. 'The public relieves Dasein of its choice, its formation of judgments, and its estimation of values'; in doing so, 'it relieves
Dasein of the task, insofar as it lives in the They, to be itself by way of itself' (HCT 247).
Two Possible Philosophical Objections
There is a naturalness now, I would suggest, to many of Heidegger's other claims about the authentic, such as that their 'readiness for anxiety' is their ' [w] anting to have a conscience', the 'call of conscience' 'summoning' them to themselves (SZ 296, 273) . But clearly it is beyond the scope of a paper of this length to embed my reading within a full account of the cluster of concepts that Heidegger's reflections on authenticity involve (including 'conscience', 'guilt', the 'nullities', 'being a whole', and, of course, 'Being-towards-death'), those that inform his more fine-grained description of inauthenticity (including 'idle talk ', 'curiosity', 'distantiality', and 'ambiguity') There are several points to make in reply to the first objection.
! 22 (ii) As indicated above, my account does, in fact, make central critical reflection on one's supposed authenticity, in the form of reflection on whether our day-to-day activities are indeed tied to our 'ownmost' projects. Being a good father is not something one can do in the abstract; rather one does it by doing other things: by taking one's children to that after-school club, by refusing to buy them yet another present, etc. But one might also perform such activities for other reasons-such as because everyone else takes their children to that club and because one is miserably tight-fisted-and identifying the reasons that are actually driving our acts certainly calls for some critical and possibly painful reflection.
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(iii) There is a danger, moreover, that we may not see the wood for the trees here. The projects that we recognize as those that speak to us pass a very particular test: they withstand trial by anxiety, while many others do not. The latter reveal themselves as 'provisional' or 'accidental' for us, while we come to see that we will act on the former come what may, irrespective of whatever legitimation or confirmation 'the world' may offer.
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(iv) We also need to recognize that in praising someone for living her life in line with her 'ownmost' possibilities, we are doing no more than acknowledging her authenticity, her 'ownedness'. We may criticise her on the grounds that those possibilities are immoral, misguided or the like; but that does not mean that we cannot recognize that she has indeed devoted herself to them. Irrespective of the value or disvalue of the possibilities to which I believe I devote myself, the question of whether (SZ 345, 338, 310) . This is a misalignment not with some external standard of meaningfulness but-first and foremost-with my own deepest sense of what matters. So there is at least prima facie reason to think of the assessment of authenticity-as I have suggested it be understood-as a different dimension on which a person-good or bad-might be assessed, just as we may assess him by reference to how imaginative or energetic or determined he is. We do so despite the fact that we may wish-in the case of the bad-that he were not quite so imaginative, energetic, determined or-the case in point-authentic.
(v) In criticising someone's weddedness to a particular project we must also recognize that we do so by reference to some other standard or commitment. Among the consequences of this is that, if my account is correct, then the only such critical judgment that we may ourselves 'own'-or make on our own behalf, one might sayis one by reference to another standard or commitment that speaks to us. A judgment by any other standard might be correct in some other sense-my actions may indeed be immoral, for example-but my accepting that judgment will be my deferring to an opinion I have perhaps been told to adopt, or to an opinion I am merely going along with, rather than truly sharing. One sometimes perhaps should act in that way, that 'should' being a moral, aesthetic or rational imperative, say; but it still represents a falling short of a recognizable ideal of how we govern our lives.
Finally, let us turn to the second objection, that nothing may 'speak to us'. That, one might indeed suggest, is 'the modern condition', the malaise of modern humanity to which existentialism gives striking expression and, in particular, in its explorations of anxiety.
It is not my concern to deny the possibility of such an experience-which might well be compared with 'world collapse'-or to deny its broader cultural and philosophical significance: it may well be a focal concern of some philosophers we label 'existentialists'.
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But such an experience cannot play the role that anxiety (or death) plays in Heidegger. In particular, it is an experience in the face of which one can do nothing; and, therefore, it cannot be the experience for which the authentic are 'ready' and the inauthentic not. I have argued instead that the challenge that the former meet and the latter fail is one set for those to whom some possibilities do speak. Those to whom none speak have problems of their own.
I touched above on Wittgensteinian views according to which our life with language rests on contingent facts about our readiness to find natural certain reactions to samples and other multiply-interpretable explanations; and it is tempting to propose that the very possibility of meaningful action requires that there be projects that similarly speak to us-that strike us as worthwhile in themselves. This returns us once again to Sec. 1's notion that Dasein must be Serving them is a 'hypothetical imperative', as it were.
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Complex questions I will not discuss here are: ought there only to be one project that ! 29
Other chapters in this collection raise issues for my proposals here, and vice versa. To take 26 just five examples, how does my reading stand to Haynes' complex mapping of the anxiety discussion, Käufer's account of Jaspers 'spiritual types', Withy's account of our 'owning' of our pathē, Wrathall's discussion of 'fluid action', and the claim that 'normative force' can never be a 'given' (discussed by Blattner (pp. ###) and Crowell (pp. ###)), which might well seem incompatible with my notion of projects that 'speak to us'? But I won't address these issues here, as this editor feels he ought not to give himself the last word.
A further complexity that this touches on is that our on-going engagement with life-with 27 the many situations demanding of action that we encounter-constitutes an on-going trial of what we take our 'ownmost' possibilities to amount to. This brings into play Heidegger's elusive discussion of 'the Situation' (SZ 302) and his appropriation of the notion of phronesis.
But I will not discuss these matters further here. ! 31
